Introduction
Tang, Chen, and Lin, C. (2008) define financial reporting quality as the extent to which the financial statements provide true and fair view of the underlying performance and financial position. However, Jonas and Blanchet (2000) provide a commonly accepted definition, as quality financial reporting is full and transparent financial information that is not designed to obfuscate or mislead users. In the words of Watkins, Hillison and Morecroft (2004) financial reporting quality refers to how well financial information of a company reflects the true economic circumstances of the company.
From the above expressions, it may be understood that financial reporting is an efficient tool for management to communicate the performance of the company to stakeholders, as they base their resource allocation decisions on financial information, thus, the financial reporting quality is a prerequisite for efficient capital markets. The following two general perspectives, described by Jonas and Blanchet (2000) are widely used to assess financial reporting quality: (1) The first perspective relies on the needs of users and emphasizes that the quality of financial reporting is determined on the basis of the usefulness of the financial information to its users; (2) The second perspective focuses on the necessity of financial reporting quality for shareholder and investor protection.
In other words, the first perspective known as the user needs perspective is mainly concerned with the provision of relevant information to users for making decisions, whereas, the second perspective known as, shareholder/investor protection perspective aims at ensuring that the transparent and competent information provided to users is sufficient for their needs.
The utility of financial reports and their quality is further examined by Schipper and Vincent (2003) as the financial reporting quality is very important, and necessity to users to move decision as they need reliable financial information to base their resource allocation decisions. Specifically, auditors, management, audit committees, and boards of directors, have an interest in high quality financial reports to reduce the cost of capital and attract potential investors, for which they follow rules and regulations developed by the regulators and standard setters by promulgating necessary rules that aim for the effectiveness of capital markets.
Thus, the concept of financial reporting quality is broad and significant as it states the quality or useful financial information, disclosure practices and non-financial information to help in decision making, where the role of audit committee members assumes a greater significance in ensuring the financial reporting quality.
In this context, an attempt is made to establish the relationship conceptually between financial reporting quality and audit committee quality characteristics; to examine how the top management discharged their financial reporting responsibilities to ensure the financial reporting quality.
Evaluating financial reporting quality is a part of the corporate oversight responsibilities of Audit Committees and one of the primary functions of audit committees is to monitor the financial reporting system of the firm, and contribute to corporate control, hence, the audit committees are expected to improve the financial reporting quality of a company.
Realizing the importance of the audit committee in ensuring the financial reporting quality, India began to think in terms of Audit Committees, and has been gaining popularity since 1980. In 1991, the economic reforms placed a great importance on the role of the audit committee, and in 1992, the stock market scam and liberalization of the economy led to the introduction of audit committee requirements. In 1998, constitution of audit committees was recommended by the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) in its Code of Corporate Governance, which is the first and unique instance of an industry association taking the lead in prescribing audit committee standards for listed companies.
The Reserve Bank of India, in 1999, made it mandatory for all listed banks to establish audit committees as a sub-committee of Board of Directors constituted with non-executive directors, which were to be a liaison between the internal and external auditors and the board of directors. Furthermore, the Companies Act -Amendment (2000, Section 29A) provided for the formation and functioning of audit committees and contains a provision that every public company having paid-up capital of Rs. 5,00,00,000 or more must establish an Audit Committee. Similar requirements for audit committees are prescribed under clause 49 of the Listing Agreement issued by Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which required all listed companies must have a qualified and an independent Audit Committee, generally consisting of non-executive directors. This clause was amended in 2004. The non-executive director requirement was removed and replaced with specification that the audit committees should have a minimum of three members with two-thirds of them being independent, and made it mandatory that all companies listed on the stock exchanges had to establish audit committees in their companies. Sarkar and Sarkar (2010) , in their study, found that a majority of companies have adhered to this regulation and have constituted audit committees with the minimum size of three, as required under the regulations.
It is stipulated by Section 292A of Companies Act, 1956 , that an Audit Committee should have discussions with the auditors periodically about internal control systems, ensure compliance of internal control systems, and scrutinize the scope of audit including the observations of auditors and review of the half yearly and annual financial statements before submission to the Board and that an Audit Committee shall have authority to investigate into anything in relation to such matters and shall have full access to information contained in records of the company.
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement empowers the Audit Committee to investigate any activity within its terms of reference, seek information from any employee, obtains outside advice and secure attendance of outsiders, if necessary. Within its purview lies the responsibility to recommend the appointment and removal of external auditor, fix audit fees, approve payment for other services, review with the management the annual financial statements before submission to the Board, review the adequacy of internal control system, oversight of the financial reporting process of the company, disclosure of financial information to ensure that financial statements are correct, sufficient and credible; review the adequacy of internal audit function; review the financial and risk management policies of the company; review the functioning of whistle blower policy and look into reasons for substantial defaults.
In summary, through the intervention of premier industrial association the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and statutory and regulatory bodies like The Company Act and Listing Agreement (SEBI), India has developed a strong and empowered culture of Audit Committees in companies that perform their functions credibly.
The next section, literature review, describes state of art and previous studies' result as well as proposed hypotheses. Following that, research method section provides detailed research design and data analysis method. The research findings are discussed in the next section before research conclusion.
Literature Review
In the post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) era, monitoring the financial reporting quality of a company, is recognized as a central concern of the of audit committees for the smooth functioning of capital markets, and became as the primary focus of corporate governance reform. Early accounting focused on research whether the existence of an audit committee improved financial reporting quality of firms and the general finding was that there is a positive association between the presence of an audit committee and the financial reporting quality of the firm. In this context, Wild (1996) found too, that the earnings response coefficients for companies with audit committees were higher after the appointment of the audit committee. Therefore, the focus of recent research has been specifically on the characteristics of audit committees and their association with proxies of financial reporting quality of the firm. More particular, independence and financial expertise are two major attributes of the audit committee were focused much in research literature [see for example and ]. A strong proponent of independence, Securities and Exchange Commission (1999) argue that audit committees consisting of independent directors would lead to higher financial reporting quality, because they would have reduced conflicts of interest and lessened incentive to sacrifice objectivity. Consistent with this argument, the research concluded by , Abbott, Parker and Peters (2002) , Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) , Persons (2004) and Archambeault, Dezoort and Hermanson (2008) , show that audit committee independence reduce earnings management, or the likelihood of financial reporting restatement and financial reporting fraud. Krishnan (2005) stated that independent audit committees are significantly less likely to be associated with the incidence of internal control problems over financial reporting. Whereas, Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Neal (2009) , concluded that the previous quantitative studies found that higher quality financial reporting and auditing is associated with more independent, expert and diligent audit committees. To sum up, Empirical evidence that the independence of audit committees enhance the quality of financial reporting has been revealed by many studies.
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) had advised that, considering the complexities of financial reporting at least a subset of audit committees should have financial reporting expertise, as Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) documented that the performance of an audit committee is enhanced when audit committees have members with financial expertise.
The research has consistently found that it is specifically accounting financial expertise of the Audit Committee that yields monitoring benefits. One recent study, Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal (2010) , used post-SOX data to show that the positive association between accounting financial expertise and financial reporting quality (discretionary accruals) holds true only for firms with weak corporate governance systems, suggesting that, in the post-SOX era, audit committee accounting expertise substitutes for other corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, the appointment of an accounting expert could only improve financial reporting quality when there are complimentary governance provisions (Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein and Neal, 2008) . On the other hand, firms with strong corporate governance may exert stronger control over the firm's financial reporting decisions, irrespective of the activities of the audit committee, and thus reduce the impact of audit committee financial expertise on the financial reporting quality of the firm (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides, 2000) .
Audit Committees play a very prominent role today in overseeing and monitoring the participation of the management and the independent auditor in the financial reporting process. Some of studies have in later period also shown that audit committees recruit members with significant accounting expertise and that they are involved in substantive financial reporting and oversight practices, assessing the subjective judgments of the management, meeting more frequently, and more often disagreeing with the accounting and reporting decisions of the management.
If an audit committee does not possess accounting expertise, and the lack of accounting expertise results in inadequate financial monitoring, appointing an accounting expert introduces a monitor who is intimately familiar with the financial reporting process, and the new accounting skills allow the audit committee to more effectively monitor the reporting decisions of the managers, then improvements in financial reporting quality would be largest for firms that appointed their first accounting expert. , provided evidence that accounting skills enhanced the ability of the audit committee to oversee high-quality financial reporting.
Some studies mentioned that audit Committee size (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001 ) and number of its meetings (Menon and Williams, 1994) are the other dimensions of audit committees that have been found to be associated with financial reporting outcomes. As the audit committee characteristics have relationship with financial reporting quality, the committees may have a role in reducing in financial statements fraud.
The relationship between audit committees and financial statements fraud has been extensively studied and analyzed. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) examined the companies that were required to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for breach of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and found that companies which were manipulating their earnings were less likely to have an audit committee. This is supported by McMullen (1996) , who examined the five potential consequences of audit committees and the occurrence of errors, irregularities and illegal acts relating to financial reporting, and concluded that the companies that had Audit Committees displayed more reliable financial reporting. Abbott, Park and Parker (2000) found that firms with audit committees constituted with independent directors, and met at least twice a year, were less likely to be fraudulent or misleading financial reporting. Further, the findings of Song and Windram (2004) suggested that the financial literacy of audit committees and their activity level contributed to greater probability of companies complying with financial reporting standards.
The above review of literature may reveal that the studies were conducted by taking up one issue at a time and in a different environment. No study is provided on the analysis of effectiveness of select audit committee qualities on financial reporting quality in Indian context, hence, the present study is taken up to fill up the gap, with the following research methodology expressed in terms of objectives, sample design, tools and limitations, whereas, hypotheses and models adopted for the study are presented under the test of hypothesis:
Audit committees have attracted considerable attention from researchers due to the recent high profile financial reporting scandals, as the audit committee's play crucial role in the financial reporting processes of firms and hold more responsibility in evaluating financial reporting quality. In this context, a null hypothesis is set as below to test the relationship between audit committee quality and financial reporting quality:
H0 1 : There is no relationship between audit committee quality and financial reporting quality.
Research Method
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between audit committee quality and financial reporting quality and measuring the effect of audit committee characteristics quality on corporate governance quality. From 15916 companies listed at Bombay Stock Exchange as on 8.11.2012, 3879 companies are considered based on equity and listing, out of which 133 companies are selected randomly and information relating to financial year 2002-03 to 2011-12 are considered for this study. This study uses the formula given by Godden (2004) to justify the size of sample, as the study uses descriptive statistics dealing with probability and the population is finite. In this study, as public limited companies having a paidup capital of at least Rs.5,00,00,000, shall constitute a Committee of the Board known as Audit Committee (As required by section 292A of the Companies Act.1956), only listed companies which have Audit Committees are considered.
The data, related to the select characteristics and terms used in the models for analysis are collected from the annual reports of the select companies and notes and statements given in them. The period of the study is recent 10 years, i.e. from 2002-'03 to 2011-'12. Where, the notation of some terms such as, ABS_PMDA, OVERLAP_P, BD_IND, BD_SIZE, CEO_TENURE, CEO_HOLD, ABS_ΔNI, L-ASSETS, ln(ASSETS) and ε i,t , is given already in the context of model given up Nandini et al.
Whereas, the notation of other terms is as follows: ACIND is proportion of independent directors on audit committee. ACLEGEX is proportion of directors on audit committee with legal qualifications.
ACACCEX is proportion of directors on audit committee with accounting qualifications. ACMEET is number of audit committee meeting for the year. ACSIZE is number of audit committee members.
With the help of above equation, mean, standard deviation and correlation measures were computed and presented in table-1 and 2 respectively, and followed by the analysis. 
Source: Data extracted from Annual reports
The following may be inferred from the above table:
i)
The by last year's assets (L-ASSETS) is equal to 0.09 million with standard deviation equal to 0.24 million. The reasonably high Standard Deviation reveals that there is a significant difference in the mean value of L-ASSETS of the firms under study, indicating that there could be remarkable variation in either the amount of long-term debts of firms or in their previous year's assets. xiv) On the whole, it may be concluded that the most of the equity based listed companies at BSE under study revealed the varied facts related to compensation committee, independency of the directors, the size of the board of directors, tenure and equity owned by CEO and net income. The reason for the longer tenure in the Board and committees might be the members want to stick to the organizations as they saw them growing. Whereas, the constitution of the audit committees in Indian companies are based on the requirement of the various statutes, hence the variability is very less from their respective means. 
i)
Financial reporting quality expressed in terms of Performance Matched Discretionary Accruals (ABS_PMDA) are positively and significantly correlated with number of board directors (BD_SIZE), audit committee with independent members (ACIND) and total assets (ASSETS). This may indicate that PMDA increases with an increase in the BD_SIZE, ACIND and total assets of company. ii) OVERLAP_P is positively and significantly correlated with independency of the audit committee (ACIND). This may indicate that OVERLAP_P increase resulted in an increase in ACIND. iii) BD_IND is positively and significantly correlated with number of independent members in audit committee members (ACIND). This may indicate that BD_IND increases with an increase in the number of independent members of Audit Committees of companies, revealing that the companies' preferred independent members on their board of directors and audit committees. iv) Number of Board Directors (BD_SIZE) is negatively and significantly correlated with CEO_TENURE and equity owned by the CEO (CEO_HOLD), showing that with an increase of the tenure of the CEO and an increase in equity owned by the CEO, the number of board members of the company in the Audit Committee decreases. Whereas, the number of board of directors (BD_SIZE) is positively and statistically correlated with ACIND, ACMEET and ACSIZE. This may indicate that an increase of board members may lead to an increase in the ACIND, ACMEET and ACSIZE of the company.
The number of board directors (BD_SIZE) is negatively and significantly correlated with ACLEGEX and ACACCEX, showing that with an increase of the ACLEGEX and ACACCEX, the number of board members of the company decreases or vice versa, which may indicate that the qualifications of audit committee members affected the size of board of director negatively. Further, the number of board directors (BD_SIZE) and total assets (ASSETS) are positively and significantly correlated, indicating that an increase of board members in the Audit Committee increases the total assets of the company.
CEO_TENURE and CEO_HOLD are positively and significantly correlated. This indicates that with an increase in the CEO tenure, there is an increase in the CEO holding in the company. Further, the study of relationship between CEO_TENURE and audit committee characteristics may reveal that the CEO_TENURE has positively and significantly correlated with ACLEGEX and ACACCEX. This indicates that an increase in the CEO_ TENURE resulted in an increase in the ACLEGEX and ACACCEX of the company. Whereas, CEO_TENURE and ACSIZE are negatively and significantly correlated, this may indicate that the ACSIZE of the company is decreased when the CEO_TENURE is increased.
CEO_TENURE is negatively and significantly correlated with L_ASSETS, i.e longterm debts divided by last year's assets and total assets. This indicates that the leverage and total assets of the company decreased when the CEO_TENURE increased.
CEO_ HOLD is negatively and significantly correlated with ACIND, ACMEET, ACSIZE, indicating that ACIND, ACMEET and ACSIZE of the company decreased when the equity owned by CEO increased. Whereas, CEO_ HOLD is positively and significantly correlated with ACLEGEX and ACACCEX. This may indicate that an increase in the CEO tenure increases the ACLEGEX and ACACCEX in the company. Further, CEO_ HOLD and ASSETS are negatively and significantly correlated, indicating that the total assets of the company decreased when the equity owned by CEO increased. ii) ACIND is positively and significantly correlated with ACLEGEX and ACMEET and ASSETS. This indicates that an increase in the ACIND resulted in an increase in the ACLEGEX, ACMEET and ASSETS of the select companies. ACIND is negatively and significantly correlated with ACSIZE and L_ASSETS, indicating that the ACSIZE and L_ASSETS of the companies are decreased when the ACIND increased. iii) ACLEGEX is positively and significantly correlated with ACACCEX and ABS_ΔNI, revealing that with an increase in the ACLEGEX, there is an increase in the ACACCEX and ABS_ΔNI of the select companies. ACLEGEX is negatively and significantly correlated with ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS, showing that the ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS of the select companies are decreased when the ACLEGEX increased. iv) ACACCEX is negatively and significantly correlated with ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS. This shows that with an increase of the ACMEET and ACSIZE and ASSETS, the ACACCEX of the company decreases.
v)
ACMEET is positively and significantly correlated with ACSIZE and ASSETS, revealing that with an increase in the ACMEET, there is an increase in the ACSIZE and ASSETS in the company. ACMEET and L_ASSETS are negatively and significantly correlated, showing that with an increase of the L_ASSETS, the ACMEET of the company decreases. vi) ACSIZE and ASSETS are positively and significantly correlated. This indicates that with an increase in the ACSIZE, there is an increase in the ASSETS in the company. vii) ABS_∆NI and ASSETS are negatively and significantly correlated, which implies that as the net income of the company rises, the total assets of the company decreases. viii) L-ASSETS with ASSETS are negatively and significantly correlated, from which it may be inferred that the decrease in long-term debts of a company, increases its ASSETS.
In brief, it may be concluded from the above stated findings of the present study that the discretionary accruals increases with the size of the board of directors and the assets for the reason that the choices increase with an increase in the size of the board and assets' volume. The longterm stay by the CEO in the company or the longterm holding of the equity has a negative impact on the discretionary accruals. The board size, leverage with assets base are positively and significantly related. An interesting fact may be noticed from the study that, Board size and assets base, and CEO tenure and the equity holding of the CEO are going hand in hand. This may be due to the expansion of the size of the company and an increase in the board size with a preference to stay for a long time.
After analyzing the relationships, ANOVA is used to test the presumption that board of directors and audit committee quality has no relationship with financial reporting quality and the values are presented in the following table-3: 
Source: Data extracted from Annual reports
In the above table, the F-ratio for the regression model is computed by taking a ratio of Mean Square (MS) Regression to Mean Square Residual, and which is equal to 7.107 (2.106/0.296). The test of significance reveals that the probability of obtaining F-stat as the one or more extremes from F distribution on 13 and 1316 degrees of freedom is less than 5% level of significance. Hence, there may be no difference in mean values of board of directors and audit committee quality characteristics and financial reporting quality measures, thus this study rejects the null hypothesis, and conclude that the alternative hypothesis may be accepted, which means, there is a relationship between the characteristics of the board of directors and audit committees and financial reporting quality. Further, the impact of characteristics of directors of board and audit committee on the financial reporting quality is measured by t-test. The values of which are presented in table-4: CEO_HOLD, ACIND, ACLEGEX, ACACCEX and ABS_∆NI are accepted. In other words, for the CONSTANT, BDSIZE, ACMEET, ACSIZE, L-ASSETS and ASSETS, H0 is rejected, from which it may be concluded that there is a significant difference between boards of directors and audit committee characteristics, such as, CONSTANT, BDSIZE, ACMEET and ACSIZE.
Conclusions
From the above findings, it may be concluded that board size, audit committee meetings and its size, have relationship with the financial reporting practices, but the CEO tenure and hold, board's independence, net income, ACIND, ACLEGEX, ACACCEX and OVERLAP of audit committee members on compensation committee, have no influence on the financial reporting practices. Thus, it may be inferred that the companies may improve the financial reporting quality, by managing the board size, audit committee meetings and size, as these characteristics have significant relationship with financial reporting quality.
Moreover, this study has the limitations as, i) The study is limited to 133 equity based companies listed at Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and selected on the basis of Bill Godden principle, hence, the results may not represent of the entire industry or the economy; ii) The study is based on secondary data only and confined to analyze the same for establishing the relationship to understand the impact of select factors on audit committee quality; iii) The study used the models developed by the various authors, academicians, and researchers, after modifying them according to the need of the study, thus, sometimes the process of modifications may not truly represent the desired phenomenon; iv) There may be various characteristics that determine the audit committee quality, but the study considered only a few audit committee quality characteristics, such as, independency, size, accounting and legal qualifications of members and number of audit committee meetings.
Considering the above limitations, it may suggest to identify other important characteristics of audit committee quality and consider for future studies.
